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ABSTRACT 
 
Data Mining plays a vital role in today‟s information world where it has been widely applied 
in various organizations. The current trend needs to share data for mutual benefit. However, 
there has been a lot of concern over privacy in the recent years .It has also raised a potential 
threat of revealing sensitive data of an individual when the data is released publically. 
Various methods have been proposed to tackle the privacy preservation problem like 
anonymization and perturbation. But the natural consequence of privacy preservation is 
information loss. The loss of specific information about certain individuals may affect the 
data quality and in extreme case the data may become completely useless. There are methods 
like cryptography which completely anonymize the dataset and which renders the dataset 
useless. So the utility of the data is completely lost. We need to protect the private 
information and preserve the data utility as much as possible. So the objective of the thesis is 
to find an optimum balance between privacy and utility while publishing dataset of any 
organization. Privacy preservation is hard requirement that must be satisfied and utility is the 
measure to be optimized.  
One of the methods for preserving privacy is K-anonymization which also preserves 
privacy to a good extent. K-anonymity demands that every tuple in the dataset released be 
indistinguishably related to no fewer than k respondents. We used K-means algorithm for 
clustering the dataset and followed by k-anonymization. Decision stump classification is used 
to determine utility and privacy is determined by firing random queries on the anonymized 
dataset. The balancing point is where the utility and privacy curves intersect or they tend to 
converge. The balancing point will vary from dataset to dataset and the choice of Quasi-
identifier and sensitive attribute. For our experiment the balancing point is found to be around 
50-60 percent which is the intersecting point of privacy and utility curves.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
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1.1. Background 
The amount of data that need to be processed to extract some useful information is 
increasing. Therefore different data mining methods are adopted to get optimum result with 
respect to time and utility of data. The amount of personal data that can be collected and 
analyzed has also increased. Data mining tools are increasingly being used to infer trends and 
patterns. In many scenarios, access to large amounts of personal data is essential in order for 
accurate inferences to be drawn. However, publishing of data containing personal 
information has to be restricted so that individual privacy is not hampered. One possible 
solution is that instead of releasing the entire database, only a part of it is released which can 
answer the adequate queries and do not reveal sensitive information. Only those queries are 
answered which do not reveal sensitive information. Sometimes original data is perturbed and 
the database owner provides a perturbed answer to each query. These methods require the 
researchers to formulate their queries without access to any data. Sanitization approach can 
be used to anonymize the data in order to hide the exact values of the data. But conclusion 
can‟t be drawn with surety. Another approach is to suppress some of the data values, while 
releasing the remaining data values exactly. But suppressing the data may hamper the utility. 
A lot of research work has been done to protect privacy and many models have been 
proposed to protect databases. Out of them, k-anonymity has received considerable attention 
from computer scientist. Under k-anonymity, each piece of disclosed data is equivalent to at 
least k-1 other pieces of disclosed data over a set of attributes that are deemed to be privacy 
sensitive. 
 
1.2.  Layout of this Thesis 
The thesis has been divided into three chapters. The first chapter “Important Concepts” 
consists of those concepts which have been used for implementation and experiments. The 
second chapter “Algorithms” explains the algorithms that we have studied and implemented 
to get the results. This is followed by the Chapter “Implementation and Results” wherein we 
show and explain the results obtained by implementing our algorithms. The last chapter is 
“Conclusion and Future Work”.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
IMPORTANT CONCEPTS 
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2.1.  What is Data Mining? 
 
Data mining is a technique that helps to extract useful information from a large database. It is 
the process of extracting relevant information from large databases through the use of certain 
data mining algorithms. As the amount of data doubles every three years, data mining is 
becoming an increasingly important tool to transform this data into information. Data mining 
techniques takes a long time which requires long process of research and product 
development. This evolution started with storing of business data on computers, continued 
with improvements in data access, and more recently, generated technologies that allow users 
to search their data in real time. Data mining is ready for application in the business 
community because it is supported by three technologies that are now sufficiently mature: 
 Massive data collection 
 Powerful multiprocessor computers 
 Data mining algorithms 
 
2.2. Methods of Data Mining 
 
The Amount of data that need to be processed to extract some useful information is 
increasing. So the methods used for extracting information from huge amount of data must be 
optimum. As described in [1] the various data mining algorithms can be classified into two 
broad categories. 
 
1. Heuristic-based approaches 
 additive noise 
 multiplicative noise 
 k-anonymization 
 statistical disclosure control based approaches 
2. Cryptography -based approaches 
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2.2.1. Additive-Noise-based Perturbation Techniques 
 
Random noise is added to the actual data in additive-noise-based perturbation technique. The 
privacy is measured by evaluating how closely the original values of a modified attribute can 
be determined. In particular, if the perturbed value of an attribute can be estimated, with a 
confidence c, to belong to an interval [a, b], then the privacy is estimated by (b−a) with 
confidence c. However, this metric does not work well because it does not take into account 
the distribution of the original data along with the perturbed data.  
 
2.2.2.  Multiplicative-Noise-based Perturbation Techniques 
 
As shown in [2] Additive random noise can be filtered out using certain signal processing 
techniques with very high accuracy. This problem can be avoided by using random 
projection-based multiplicative perturbation techniques as proposed in [3]. Instead of adding 
some random values to the actual data, random matrices are used to project the set of original 
data points to a randomly chosen lower-dimensional space. However, the transformed data 
still preserves much statistical aggregate regarding the original dataset so that certain data 
mining tasks can be performed on the transformed data in a distributed environment (data are 
either vertically partitioned or horizontally partitioned) with small errors. High degree of 
privacy of original data is ensured in this approach. Even if the random matrix is disclosed, it 
only approximate value of original data can be estimated. It is impossible to get back the 
original data. The variance of the approximated data is used as privacy measure.             
 
2.2.3.  k- Anonymization Techniques 
 
K-anonymization technique for privacy preservation is introduced by Samarati and Sweeney 
[4, 5]. A database is k-anonymous with respect to quasi-identifier attributes (defined later in 
this thesis) if there exist at least k transactions in the database having the same values 
according to the quasi-identifier attributes. In practice, in order to protect sensitive dataset T, 
before releasing T to the public, T is converted into a new dataset T* that guarantees the k-
anonymity property for a sensible attribute. This is done by generalizations and suppression 
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on quasi-identifier attributes. Therefore, the degree of uncertainty of the sensitive attribute is 
at least 1/k. 
 
 
 
2.2.4. Statistical-Disclosure-Control-based Techniques 
 
To anonymize the data to be released (such as person, household and business) which can be 
used to identify an individual, additional information publicly available need to be considered 
as described in [6]. Among these methods specifically designed for continuous data, the 
following masking techniques are described: additive noise, data distortion by probability 
distribution, resampling, rank swapping, etc. The privacy level of such method is assessed by 
using the disclosure risk, that is, the risk that a piece of information be linked to a specific 
individual.  
 
2.2.5.  Cryptography-based Techniques 
 
The cryptography-based technique usually guarantees very high level of data privacy. 
Generally solution is based on the assumption that each party first encrypts its own item sets 
using commutative encryption, then the already encrypted item sets of every other party. The 
two communicating party must share a common key which is used for encryption and 
decryption. Sometimes two key is used known as public key and private key. Public key is 
known to everybody that wants to communicate with you and private key is used for 
decryption in a secure communication. Though cryptography-based techniques can well 
protect data privacy, they may not be considered good with respect to other metrics like 
efficiency. 
 
 
2.3. Privacy 
Privacy means how an individual controls who has access to his personal information. From 
another point of view, Privacy may be how the data is collected, shared and used by the 
customers. So definition of privacy varies from one environment to the other. So the 
definition of privacy as described in [1] is as follows: 
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 Privacy as the right of a person to determine which personal information about himself/ 
herself may be communicated to others. 
 Privacy as the control over access to information about oneself. 
 Privacy as limited access to a person and to all the features related to the person. 
From our experiment point of view privacy is defined in [1] as “The right of an entity 
to be secure from unauthorized disclosure of sensible information that are contained in an 
electronic repository or that can be derived as aggregate and complex information from data 
stored in an electronic repository”. 
2.4. Data Utility 
The utility of the data must be preserved to certain extent at the end of the privacy preserving 
process, because in order for sensitive information to be hidden, the database is essentially 
modified through the changing of information (through generalization and suppression) or 
through the blocking of data values. Sampling is a privacy preserving technique which does 
not modify the information stored in the database, but still, the utility of the data falls, since 
the information is not complete in this case. As we go on changing the data for preserving 
privacy, the less the database reflects the domain of interest. So, one of the evaluation 
parameter for the measuring data utility should be the amount of information that is lost after 
the application of privacy preserving process. Of course, the measure used to evaluate the 
information loss depends on the specific data mining technique with respect to which a 
privacy algorithm is performed. As defined in [7] information loss in the context of 
association rule mining will be measured either in terms of the number of rules that were both 
remaining and lost in the database after sanitization, or even in terms on the 
reduction/increase in the support and confidence of all the rules. For the case of classification, 
we can use metrics similar to those used for association rules. Finally, for clustering, the 
variance of the distances among the clustered items in the original database and the sanitized 
database can be the basis for evaluating information loss in this case. 
2.5. Generalization and Suppression 
Various method have been proposed for providing anonymity in the release of micro data, the 
k-anonymity proposal focuses on two techniques in particular: generalization and 
suppression, which, unlike other existing techniques, such as scrambling or swapping, 
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preserve the truthfulness of the information. In the following paragraph we have described it 
in detail. 
              The mapping is stated by means of a generalization relationship ≤d. Given two 
domains Di and Dj Є Dom, Di ≤d Dj states that values in domain Dj are generalizations of 
values in Di. The generalization relationship ≤d defines a partial order on the set Dom of 
domains, and is required to satisfy the following conditions as stated in [4, 6] 
C1: Di, Dj, Dz ∈  Dom: 
 
(Di ≤D Dj), (Di ≤D Dz) => (Dj ≤D Dz) V (Dz ≤D Dj),, 
 
C2: all maximal elements of Dom are singleton.  
              
Condition C1 states that for each domain Di, the set of domains generalization of Di is 
totally ordered and, therefore, each Di has at most one direct generalization domain Dj. It 
ensures determinism in the generalization process. Condition C2 ensures that all values in 
each domain can always be generalized to a single value. The definition of a generalization 
relationship implies the existence, for each domain D ∈ Dom, of a totally ordered hierarchy, 
called domain generalization hierarchy, denoted DGHD. A value generalization relationship 
is denoted as ≤v   which associates with each value in domain Di a unique value in domain Dj, 
direct generalization of Di. The value generalization relationship implies the existence, for 
each domain D, of a value generalization hierarchy, denoted VGHD. 
 
2.5.1.  k-Minimal Generalization (with Suppression) 
 
Definition 3 (Generalized table - with suppression). Let Ti and Tj be two tables defined on 
the same set of attributes. Table Tj is said to be a generalization (with tuple suppression) of 
table Ti, denoted Ti ≤ Tj, if: 
1. | Tj| ≤ | Ti| 
2. The domain dom(A, Tj) of each attribute A in Ti is equal to, or a generalization of, the 
domain dom(A, Ti) of attribute A in Ti 
3. It is possible to define an injective function associating each tuple t j in Tj with a tuple ti in 
Ti, such that the value of each attribute in t i is equal to, or a generalization of, the value of the 
corresponding attribute in ti. 
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2.6. k-Anonymity and k-Anonymous Tables 
 
The concept of k-anonymity requires that the released private table (PT) should be 
indistinguishably related to no less than a certain number of respondents which is followed by 
all statistical community and by agencies. The set of attributes included in the private table, 
also externally available and therefore exploitable for linking, is called quasi-identifier. The 
k-anonymity requirement described in [6] states that every tuple released cannot be related to 
fewer than k respondents. 
 
Definition 1 (k-anonymity requirement): Each release of data must be such that every 
combination of values of quasi-identifiers can be indistinctly matched to at least k 
respondents. 
To guarantee the k-anonymity requirement, k-anonymity requires each quasi identifier value 
in the released table to have at least k occurrences, as stated in [6] 
 
Definition 2 (k-anonymity): Let T(A1……….Am) be a table, and QI be a quasi-identifier 
associated with it. T is said to satisfy k-anonymity with respect to QI if each sequence of 
values in T[QI] appears at least with k occurrences in T[QI]. 
  
This is a sufficient condition for k-anonymity requirement. If a set of attributes of external 
tables appears in the Quasi identifier associated with the private table PT, and the table 
satisfies Definition 2, the combination of the released data with the external data will never 
allow the recipient to associate each released tuple with less than k respondents. For example 
with respect to the student data table in Fig.1 and quasi identifier { Dept, C.G., Age, Roll 
NO} it easy to see that the table satisfies k-anonymity with k = 2 only, since there are  single 
occurrences of values over the considered quasi-identifier (e.g., two occurrence of (“ CIV, 
>7, >20, 106010**"). 
 
For k-anonymization we need to identify the quasi identifier from a set of attributes present in 
the original table. The quasi-identifier depends on the external information available to the 
recipient which determines the extent of linking (not all possible external tables are available 
to every possible data recipient). Therefore, although the identification of the correct quasi-
identifier for a private table can be a difficult task, it is assumed that the quasi-identifier has 
been properly recognized and defined. For instance, in the student dataset of Fig.1 the quasi- 
identifiers are {Dept, C.G., Age, Roll NO}. 
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Table 2.1: 2-anonymized table 
 
2.7. Attacks on k-Anonymized Datasets 
 
Sufficient care must be taken while selecting the quasi identifier because a solution that  
adheres to k-anonymity can still be vulnerable to attacks. Some possible attacks identified by 
Sweeney [8] are described below. 
 
2.7.1. Unsorted matching attack against k-anonymity:  
This attack is based on the order in which tuples appear in the released table. It can be 
corrected of course, by randomly sorting the tuples of the solution table. Otherwise, the 
release of a related table can leak sensitive information. For example a PT having two 
attributes is released twice. The quasi identifier is different in the two released table T1 and 
T2. If the orders of tuples are same in T1 and T2 then both tables can be linked to get back 
the original table. 
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2.7.2. Complementary release attack against k-anonymity:  
It is more common that the attributes that constitute the quasi-identifier are themselves a 
subset of the attributes released. Therefore, subsequent releases of the same privately held 
information must consider all of the previously released attributes of T, so that it can prohibit 
linking on T. 
 
2.7.3. Temporal attack against k-anonymity:  
Data collections are dynamic. Tuples are added, changed, and removed constantly. As a 
result, releases of generalized data over time can be subject to a temporal inference attack. It 
is described in [8] by Sweeney. Let table T0 be the original privately held table at time t=0. 
Assume a k-anonymity solution based on T0, which is called table RT0, is released. At time t, 
assume additional tuples were added to the privately held table T0, so it becomes Rt. Let RTt 
be a k-anonymity solution based on Tt that is released at time t. Because there is no 
requirement that RTt respect RT0, linking the tables RT0 and RTt may reveal sensitive 
information and thereby compromise k-anonymity protection. To combat this problem, RT0 
should be considered as joining other external information. Therefore, either all of the 
attributes of RT0 would be considered a quasi identifier for subsequent releases, or 
subsequent releases themselves would be based on RT0. 
 
2.7.4. Homogeneity Attack:   
When the non sensitive information of an individual is known to the attacker then sensitive 
information may be revealed based on the known information. It occurs if there is no 
diversity in the sensitive attributes for a particular block. This method of getting sensitive 
information is also known as positive disclosure. This suggests that in addition to k-
anonymity, the sanitized table should also ensure “diversity” – all tuples that share the same 
values of their quasi-identifiers should have diverse values for their sensitive attributes. 
 
2.7.5. Background Knowledge Attack: 
 If the user has some extra demographic information which can be linked to the released data 
which helps in neglecting some of the sensitive attributes,  then some sensitive information 
about an individual might be revealed. This method of revealing information is also known as 
negative disclosure. 
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 To eliminate the homogeneity and background knowledge attack diversity in the 
sensitive information is necessary. The method of diversifying the sensitive attributes in 
a block is called l-diversity. 
 
2.8. Privacy Principles: 
 
The information published in the anonymized table is prone to attack due to the background 
knowledge of the adversary as described in [9]. So the private information might be revealed 
in two ways: positive disclosure and Negative disclosure. 
 
2.8.1. Positive disclosure:  
The original table T published after anonymization as T* results in a positive disclosure if the 
adversary can correctly identify the value of a sensitive attribute with high probability; i.e., 
given a δ > 0, there is a positive disclosure if β (q, s, T*) > (1 – δ) and there exists t Є T such 
that t[Q] = q and t[S] = s. 
 
2.8.2. Negative disclosure:  
The original table T after anonymization is published as T* results in a negative disclosure if 
the adversary can correctly eliminate some possible values of the sensitive attribute with high 
probability; i.e., given an Є > 0, there is a negative disclosure if β (q, s, T*) < Є and there 
exists a t Є T such that t[Q] = q but t[S] != s. 
 
 As described by Machanavajjhala in [9] all positive disclosures are not disastrous neither 
all negative disclosure. If the prior belief was that α (q, s) > 1−δ, the adversary would not 
have learned anything new. Hence, the ideal definition of privacy can be based on the 
following principle: 
 
2.8.3. Uninformative Principle:  
The published table should provide the adversary with little additional information beyond 
the background knowledge. In other words, there should not be a large difference between the 
prior and posterior beliefs. 
 
13 
 
Suppose the published table T* has two constants ρ1 and ρ2, we say that a (ρ1, ρ2)-
privacy breach has occurred when either α (q, s) < ρ1   β (q, s, T*) > ρ2 or when α (q, s) > 1 
− ρ1   β (q, s, T*) < 1−ρ2. If a (ρ1, ρ2) privacy breach has not occurred, then table T* 
satisfies (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy. 
2.9. l-Diversity: 
The drawback of k-anonymization due to the background knowledge attack can be removed 
by diversifying the values of sensitive attribute within a block. The l-diversity model is a 
very useful model for preventing attribute disclosure and it has been introduced in [9]. 
 l-Diversity Principle: A q*-block is l-diverse if it contains at least l well-represented 
values for the sensitive attribute S. A table is l-diverse if every q*-block is l-diverse. The 
l-diversity principle advocates ensuring l well-represented values for the sensitive 
attribute in every q-block, but does not clearly state what well-represented means.  
2.9.1. Properties: 
 Knowledge of the full distribution of the sensitive and non-sensitive attributes is not 
required in l-diversity. 
 l-diversity does not even require the data publisher to have as much information as the 
adversary. The larger the value of l, the more information is needed to rule out possible 
values of the sensitive attribute. 
 Different adversaries can have different background knowledge leading to different 
inferences. It simultaneously protects against all of them without the need for checking 
which inferences can be made with which levels of background knowledge. 
 
2.9.2.  Distinct l-diversity: 
The term “well represented” in the definition of l-diversity would be to ensure there are at 
least l distinct values for the sensitive attribute in each equivalence class. Distinct l-diversity 
does not prevent probabilistic inference attacks. It may happen that in an anonymized block 
one value appear much more frequently than other values, enabling an adversary to conclude 
that an entity in the equivalence class is very likely to have that value.  
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2.9.3.  Entropy l-diversity:  
The entropy of an equivalence class E is defined to be  
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦 𝐸 =  − 𝑝 𝐸, 𝑠 log𝑝(𝐸, 𝑠)
𝑠𝜖𝑆
 
Where S is the domain of the sensitive attribute, and p(E, s) is the fraction of records in E that 
have sensitive value s. A table is said to have entropy l-diversity if for every equivalence 
class E, Entropy(E) ≥ log l. Entropy l- diversity is strong than distinct l-diversity. In order to 
have entropy l-diversity for each equivalence class, the entropy of the entire table must be at 
least log (l). Sometimes this may too restrictive, as the entropy of the entire table may be low 
if a few values are very common.  
 
2.9.4.  Recursive (c, l)-diversity:  
Recursive (c, l)-diversity ensure that the most frequent value does not appear too frequently, 
and the less frequent values do not appear too rarely. Let m be the number of values in an 
equivalence class, and ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ m be the number of times that the ith most frequent sensitive 
value appears in an equivalence class E. Then E is said to have recursive (c, l)-diversity if  
r1 < c(rl +rl+1 +...+rm). A table is said to have recursive (c, l)-diversity if all of its equivalence 
classes have recursive (c, l)-diversity. 
 
2.10. Attacks on l-diverse data: 
 
2.10.1. Skewness Attack:  
l-diversity does not prevent attribute disclosure if the overall distribution is skewed. Consider 
an equivalence class has an equal number of positive records and negative records. It satisfies 
distinct 2-diversity, entropy 2-diversity, and any recursive (c, 2)-diversity requirement that 
can be imposed. However, this presents a serious privacy risk, because anyone in the class 
would be considered to have 50% possibility of being positive, as compared with the 1% of 
the overall population. Now consider an equivalence class that has 49 positive records and 
only 1 negative record. It would be distinct 2-diverse and has higher entropy than the overall 
table (and thus satisfies any Entropy l-diversity that one can impose), even though anyone in 
the equivalence class would be considered 98% positive, rather than 1% percent. In fact, this 
15 
 
equivalence class has exactly the same diversity as a class that has 1 positive and 49 negative 
record, even though the two classes present very different levels of privacy risks.  
 
2.10.2. Similarity Attack:  
When the sensitive attribute values in an equivalence class are distinct but semantically 
similar, an adversary can learn important information. Consider the following example. Table 
2.2 is the original table, and Table 2.3 shows an anonymized version satisfying distinct and 
entropy 3-diversity. There are two sensitive attributes: Salary and Disease. Suppose one 
knows that Bob‟s record corresponds to one of the first three records, then one knows that 
Bob‟s salary is in the range [3K–5K] and can infer that Bob‟s salary is relatively low. This 
attack applies not only to numeric attributes like “Salary”, but also to categorical attributes 
like “Disease”. Knowing that Bob‟s record belongs to the first equivalence class enables one 
to conclude that Bob has some stomach-related problems, because all three diseases in the 
class are stomach-related. 
 
 
Table 2.2: Original Salary/Disease table 
 
Table 2.3: A 3-diverse version of table 2.1 
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This leakage of sensitive information occurs because while l-diversity requirement ensures 
“diversity” of sensitive values in each group, it does not take into account the semantical 
closeness of these values.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Algorithms 
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3.1.  Samarati’s Algorithm for K-anonymization: 
Samarati [4] proposed an algorithm for k-anonymization in 2001. This algorithm uses 
generalization and tuple suppression over quasi-identifiers to obtain a k-anonymized table 
with maximum suppression of MaxSup tuples. This algorithm uses binary search on the 
generalization hierarchy to save time. It assumes that a table PT with more than k attributes is 
present which is to be k-anonymized.  
            Given a table PT and a generalization hierarchy, different possible generalizations 
exist. Not all generalizations, however, can be considered equally satisfactory. For instance, 
the trivial generalization bringing each attribute to the highest possible level of 
generalization, thus collapsing all tuples in T to the same list of values, provides k-anonymity 
at the price of a strong generalization of the data. Such extreme generalization is not needed 
if a more specific table (i.e., containing more specific values) exists which satisfies k-
anonymity. A naïve approach to compute a k-minimal generalization would then consist in 
following each generalization strategy (path) in the domain generalization hierarchy stopping 
the process at the first generalization that satisfies k-anonymity. However this approach 
becomes impractical when number of paths increase. A better approach to find k-minimal 
generalization is proposed in [4]. In this approach concept of distance vector is induced and 
exploited. Let PT be a table and x,y Є PT be two tuples such that x =(v1.........vn) and 
y=(v1‟……vn‟) where vi  and vi‟ are values in domain Di  The distance vector between x and 
y is the vector Vx,y = [d1……..dn] where di is the (equal) length of the two paths from vi  and 
vi‟ to their closest common ancestor in the value generalization hierarchy VGHD i (or, in other 
words, the distance from the domain of vi and vi‟  to the domain at which they generalize to 
the same value vi). For example consider table PT illustrated in Table 1 and the 
generalization hierarchies for different attributes illustrated in Fig. 2. Assume Dept, C.G., 
Age and Roll No. to be a quasi-identifier. The distance vector between (CIV, 7.5, 20, 
10601012) and (CIV, 8.6, 21, 10601026) is [0,1,1,1], at which they both generalize to 
(CIV,>7,>20,106010**).  
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State Dept C.G. Age Roll No. 
Orissa CIV 7.5 20 10601012 
Bihar CIV 8.6 21 10601026 
Delhi ELE 6.8 23 10602035 
Maharashtra ELE 6.4 23 10602039 
Orissa ELE 8.3 24 10602029 
Bihar ELE 8.4 25 10602025 
Bihar MEC 8.4 22 10603042 
West Bengal MEC 9.5 21 10603059 
Delhi MET 7.2 22 10604068 
Orissa MET 6.8 22 10604022 
Orissa MET 8.9 23 10604053 
                                    
Table 3.1: Private Table (PT)  
 
Figure 3.1: Generalization Hierarchy     
 
Figure 3.2: Distance Vector Lattice for PT 
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Figure 3.3: Distance Vector Matrix for PT 
 
 
Algorithm: 
Input: Table Ti =PT[QI] to be generalized, anonymity requirement k, suppression threshold 
MaxSup, lattice VLDT of distance vectors corresponding to generalization hierarchy 
DGHDT, where DT is the tuples of the domain of quasi-identifier attributes. 
Output: The distance vector solution of generalized table GTsol, that is k-minimal 
generalization of PT[QI]. 
Method: Executes a binary search on VLDT based on height of vectors in lattice. 
1. Low:=0; high=height(T, VLDT); sol:=T 
2. While (low < high) do 
3. try:= 
(low +high )
2
  
4. Vectors:={vec|height(vec, VLDT)=try} 
5. reach_k:= false 
6. while vectors ≠ Φ ^ reach_k ≠ true do 
7. select and remove vec from vectors 
8. if satisfies (vec,k,Ti,MaxSup) then sol:=vec; reach_k:=true 
9. end If 
10. if reach_k = true then high:= try else low:=try+1 
11. end If 
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12. End of while 
13. End of while 
14. Return sol 
3.2. One-Pass K-Means Algorithm 
This algorithm was proposed by Jun-Lin and Meng-Cheng in 2008 [12]. It is derived from the 
standard k-means algorithm but it runs for one iteration. This algorithm has two stages first is 
the clustering stage and second is the adjustment stage. 
Clustering stage:  
 Let n be the total number of records present in the table T to be anonymized. Then N =  
n
k
  
where k is the value of k-anonymity. Clustering stage proceeds by sorting all the records and 
then randomly picking N records as seeds to build clusters. Then for each record r remaining 
in the dataset, algorithm checks to find the cluster o which this record is closest and assigns 
the record to the cluster and updates its centroid. The difference between the traditional k-
means algorithm and OKA is that in OKA whenever a record is added to the cluster its 
centroid is updated thus improving the assignments in future and the centroid represents the 
real centre of the cluster. In OKA the records are first sorted according to the quasi-identifiers 
thus making sure that similar tuples are assigned to the same cluster. The algorithm has a 
complexity of O 
n2
k
 . 
Algorithm: Clustering stage 
Input: a set T of n records; the value k for k-anonymity 
Output: a partitioning P = {𝑃1, . . . , PK} of T 
 
1. Sort all records in dataset T by their quasi-identifiers; 
2. Let N :=  
𝑛
𝑘
 ; 
3. Randomly select N distinct records 𝑟1, . . . , 𝑟𝑁 belongs to T ; 
4. Let 𝑃 𝑖 := {𝑟𝑖} for i = 1 to N; 
5. Let T := T \ {𝑟1, . . . ,𝑟𝑁 }; 
6. While (T != null ;) do 
7. Let r be the first record in T ; 
8. Calculate the distance between r to each 𝑃𝑖; 
9. Add r to its closest 𝑃𝑖; update centroid of 𝑃𝑖; 
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10. Let T := T \ {r}; 
11. End of While 
 
Adjustment Stage:  
In the clustering stage the clusters that are formed can contain more than k tuples and there 
can be some clusters containing less than k tuples, therefore when these clusters are 
anonymized will not satisfy condition for k-anonymity. These clusters need to be resized to 
contain at least k tuples. The goal of this adjustment stage is to make the clusters contain at 
least k records, while minimizing the information loss. This algorithm first removes the extra 
tuples from the clusters and then assigns those tuples to the clusters having less than k tuples. 
The removed tuples are farthest from the centroid of the cluster and while assigning the 
tuples to the clusters it checks the cluster which is closest to the tuple before assigning it, thus 
minimizing the information loss. If no cluster contains less than k tuples and some records are 
left they are assigned to this respective closest clusters. The time complexity of this algorithm 
is O 
n2
k
  
Algorithm: Adjustment Stage 
Input: a partitioning P = {𝑃1, . . . , PK } of T 
Output: an adjusted partitioning P = {𝑃1, . . . , PK } of T 
 
1. Let R := null ; 
2. For each cluster P belongs to p with |P| > k do 
3. Sort tuples in P by distance to centroid of P; 
4. While (|P| > k) do 
5. r belongs to P is the tuple farthest from centroid of P; 
6. Let P := P \ {r}; R := R [ {r}; 
7. End of While 
8. End of For 
9. While (R != null) do 
10. Randomly select a record r from R; 
11. Let R := R \ {r}; 
12. If P contains cluster Pi such that |Pi| < k then 
13. Add r to its closest cluster Pi satisfying |Pi| < k; 
14. Else 
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15. Add r to its closest cluster; 
16. End If 
17. End of While 
 
3.3. K-Anonymization Algorithm Based on OKA 
Once the table T is organized into clusters having at least K tuples, we can apply 
generalization hierarchy on the clusters to form a K-anonymized table. This algorithm uses 
the output of OKA and produces a K-anonymized table. The generalization hierarchy which 
is made should be complete which can map all possible values of the attribute to a single 
value. The time complexity of the algorithm is O n . 
Algorithm: 
Input: an adjusted partitioning P = {𝑃1, . . . , PK } of T and a generalization hierarchy for   
attributes 
Output: A k-anonymized table T 
1. For each Partition Pi of T do 
2. For each quasi-identifier in Pi do 
3. if attribute values for partition Pi are not same do 
4. Use Generalization hierarchy to generalize 
5. If attribute values for partition Pi are not same do 
6. Go To 4 
7. End If 
8. End If 
9. End of For 
10. End of For 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Implementation and Results 
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4.1. Tools Used: 
 
NetBeans:  NetBeans is an integrated developing environment(IDE) written in the Java 
programming language, which can be used for developing  with java, JavaScript, PHP, 
Python, Ruby, Groovy, C, C++ and much more. We have used NetBeans 6.0 to implement 
the algorithms as described in the previous chapter using java. 
 
WEKA:  Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) is a popular suite 
of machine learning software written in Java, developed at the University of Waikato. WEKA 
is free software available under the GNU General Public License. It contains a collection of 
machine learning algorithms for data mining tasks. The algorithms can either be applied 
directly to a dataset or called from your own Java code. It contains tools for data pre-
processing, classification, regression, clustering, association rules, and visualization. We have 
used WEKA 3.6 for clustering and classification. 
 
4.2. Implementation of OKA Algorithm 
As described in the previous chapter OKA has two stages: Clustering Stage and Adjustment 
Stage. We have implemented the Clustering Stage using java and observed the time required 
to cluster with varying number of records and varying K-values. This algorithm was tested on 
a sample dataset shown in Figure 4.1. We implemented this algorithm for 3 attributes: Two of 
them were numerical attributes which is used for centroid calculation and other one is 
categorical attributes. The result is shown in figure 4.2. 
 
Name Roll No. CGPA 
Ankit 10405067 8.9 
Sachin 10402061 8.5 
Piyush 10406002 9.5 
Rahul 10407008 9.1 
Sunil 10406045 7.8 
Manish 10402038 9.4 
Sweta 1040506 7.2 
 
Table 4.1: Sample Dataset 
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      We found that as the value of k increases, the time required to cluster the data also 
increases. With same k value also with increase in no of tuples, time required to cluster 
increases. 
 
 
.  
Figure 4.1: Performance of OKA with Varying K 
 
4.3. Experimental Set-up: 
 
We carried out the experiments on the standard adult database from UCI (University of 
California Irvine) machine learning repository with 32,564 records. It contains numerical as 
well as categorical attributes which is suitable for generalization required in our experiment. 
It contains the following 15 attributes which may take values as described below: 
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Attribute Attribute Values 
age continuous 
work class Private, Self-emp-not-inc, Self-emp-inc, Federal-gov, Local-gov, State- 
gov, Without-pay, Never-worked. 
fnlwgt: continuous.  
education Bachelor‟s, Some-college, 11th, HS-grad, Prof-school, Assoc-acdm, Asso-
voc, 9th, 7th-8th, 12th, Masters, 1st-4th, 10th, Doctorate, 5th-6
th
. 
education-num continuous 
marital-status Married-civ-spouse, Divorced, Never-married, Separated, Widowed, 
Married-spouse-absent, Married-AF-spouse.  
occupation Tech-support, Craft-repair, Other-service, Sales, Exec-managerial, Prof-
specialty, Handlers-cleaners, Machine-op-inspct, Adm-clerical. 
relationship Wife, Own-child, Husband, Not-in-family, Other-relative, Unmarried. 
race White, Asian-Pac-Islander, Amer-Indian-Eskimo, Other, Black 
sex Female, Male.  
capital-gain continuous. 
capital-loss continuous. 
hours-per-week continuous. 
native-country United-States, Cambodia, England, Puerto-Rico, Canada, Germany,    
Outlying-US(Guam-USVI-etc), India, Japan, Greece, South, China. 
Income >50K, <=50K 
 
Figure 4.2: UCI Dataset Attributes and Values 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 shows a sample of the adult database that we have used for conducting the 
experiments. 
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Figure 4.2: Adult Dataset From UCI Reposiotry 
 
The algorithms were implemented in java and executed on a workstation with Intel Dual Core 
Processor, 1.80 GHz and 1.00 GB of RAM on Window XP SP2 platform. 
 
Clustering: Clustering of the database is done using WEKA. We have used K-means 
clustering for our experiment. The clustered results produced by WEKA are saved for further 
use in the experiment.  Figure 4.3 shows the clustering results produced by WEKA.  
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Figure 4.3: Clusters generated by WEKA 
    Figure 4.3 shows that the clusters are not uniform and cannot be used for k-anonymization. 
Thus we need to adjust the size of these clusters so that each cluster contains at least k tuples.  
 
4.4. Generalization: 
Generalization is done on the clustered dataset from the K-means algorithm. Details of the 
data and the generalization are shown below. Out of the total 15 attributes we considered 5 
attributes as quasi-identifiers and rest as sensitive attributes. 
Generalization rules:  For age which is a numerical attribute mean of all the tuple values is 
taken. 
Mean age =    
 t(i)ki=1
k
 
Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5, Figure 4.6, figure 4.7 shows generalization hierarchy for education, 
native-country,  race and work class. These generalization hierarchies are used for k-
anonymizing evenly clustered data. 
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Figure 4.4: generalization heirarchy for education 
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Figure 4.5: generalization Heirarchy for Native-country 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Generalization Hierarchy for Race 
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Figure 4.7: Generalization Hierarchy for Work class 
 
 
4.5. Methodology Used for determining Utility and Privacy: 
 
Utility:  To determine the utility of the dataset we have used Decision stump algorithm for 
classification which is already implemented in WEKA. Decision stump is a machine 
learning model consisting of a single-level decision tree with a categorical or numeric class 
label. The results produced by WEKA clearly show percentage of tuples that can be correctly 
classified using the algorithm.  
 
Privacy: To determine the extent of privacy preserved by the dataset we counted the number 
of attributes whose values are completely suppressed. For example the generalization 
hierarchy shown in Figure 4.7 suppresses the attribute value by generalizing the whole 
domain to „xxx‟. Queries used for calculating privacy for our generalization hierarchy are as 
follows: 
 Select count (*) from dataset where education = „xxx‟ ; 
 Select count (*) from dataset where country = „xxx‟ ; 
 Select count (*) from dataset where race = „xxx‟ ; 
 Select count (*) from dataset where work class = „xxx‟ ; 
 
Privacy % =      
Total  number  of  suppressed  values
Total  number  of  quasi −identifier  values
 ∗ 100 
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Percentage of privacy preserved in the anonymized dataset is given by the above formula.  
  
Anonymizing sample dataset containing 1000 tuples: 
 
Experiment 1:  
In the first experiment we considered only six attributes, age, education, marital status, 
occupation, race and native-country for our analysis. We randomly selected 1000 tuples from 
the dataset for anonymization to determine how utility varies with privacy. Age, education, 
race and country are considered as quasi-identifiers and other two as sensitive attributes. First 
we used WEKA to arrange the data into clusters according to the value of k. As described in 
section 4.3 the clusters produced by WEKA may contain less than k tuples, thus an 
adjustment is required so that each cluster contains at least k tuples. 
Before applying the generalization clusters are adjusted so that each cluster contains at least k 
tuples. After adjusting the clusters, k-anonymization is done based on the generalization 
hierarchy. We have implemented k anonymization algorithm based on OKA to generalize the 
adjusted clusters. Figure 4.8 shows a 5-k anonymized dataset obtained after anonymizing. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: 5-anonymized dataset 
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Results:   For evaluating utility, we performed the classification mining on the k-
anonymized dataset (DT). Classification was performed by using WEKA Data Mining 
Software considering native-country as classification variable. We considered the percentage 
of correctly classified tuples as the utility of the dataset. Figure 4.9 shows the results 
produced by the WEKA on using decision stump algorithm for a 3-anonymized dataset. 
Privacy was calculated by counting the number of tuples which are generalized to xxx. 
Privacy percentage is calculated as described in section 4.5. Privacy and utility was 
calculated by varying the value of k. The balancing point between utility and privacy is the 
point where privacy and utility curves intersect or tend to converge. Figure 4.10 shows the 
variation of utility and privacy with k. It clearly follows from the figure that on increasing the 
value of k privacy provided by the dataset increases but utility decreases. For this sample 
dataset the balancing point comes between k=8 and k=9, and utility of the dataset at 
balancing point is around 60%. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: WEKA Classification Result for 3-Anonymized Dataset 
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Figure 4.10: Variation of Utility And privacy with anonymization(1000 tuples) 
 
Experiment 2:  
In the second experiment we considered all the attributes for our analysis, to study the effect 
of more number of attributes on the privacy and the utility of the k-anonymized dataset. We 
randomly selected 1000 tuples from the dataset for anonymization to determine how utility 
varies with privacy. Age, work class, education, race and native-country are considered as 
quasi-identifiers and all other attributes as sensitive attributes. Similar steps were followed as 
in experiment 1 to study the variation of utility and privacy on varying k value. Figure 4.11 
shows a 5-k anonymized dataset obtained after anonymizing. 
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Figure 4.11: 3-anonymized Dataset 
 
Results:   As described in previous experiment privacy and utility were calculated by 
varying the value of k. The balancing point between utility and privacy is the point where 
privacy and utility curves intersect or tend to converge. Figure 4.12 shows the variation of 
utility and privacy with k. For this sample dataset the balancing point comes between k=11 
and k=12, and utility of the dataset at balancing point is around 52%. Thus on increasing the 
number of quasi-identifiers considered for analysis the balancing point is shifts down and 
values of k at which balance is achieved increases. 
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Figure 4.12: Variation of Utility And privacy with anonymization(1000 tuples) 
 
 
Anonymizing sample dataset containing 3000 tuples:  
In this experiment we took 3000 tuples from the adult dataset and carried out the same 
experiment. We considered all the attributes for our analysis, to study the effect of more 
number of tuples on the privacy and the utility of the k-anonymized dataset. Age, work class, 
education, race and native-country are considered as quasi-identifiers and all other attributes 
as sensitive attributes. Similar steps were followed as in experiment 1 to study the variation 
of utility and privacy on varying k value. Figure 4.13 shows variation of utility and privacy 
on varying value of k. For this sample dataset the balancing point comes between k=10 and 
k=11, and utility of the dataset at balancing point is around 50%. 
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Figure 4.13: Variation of Utility and Privacy with anonymization (3000 tuples) 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Conclusion  
And  
Future Work 
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Conclusion: In order to improve the privacy offered by the dataset, utility of the data 
suffers. On conducting the experiments we found that the balancing point between utility 
and privacy depends on the dataset and value of k cannot be generalized for all datasets 
such that utility and privacy are balanced.  
          On varying the number of sensitive attributes in a dataset the balancing point 
varies. We found that if number of quasi-identifiers increases balancing point moves 
down and balance between utility and privacy occurs at a higher value of k. Thus if a 
dataset contains more number of quasi-identifiers then the utility as well as privacy 
attained at balancing point will be less than the dataset having fewer quasi-identifiers. 
         We also studied the affect of number of tuples in the data set on the balancing point 
and found that as the number of tuple increases there is slight shift in the balancing point 
and the value of k for which balancing occurs. Thus we can approximately predict the 
balancing point for a huge dataset by conducting experiment on a sample dataset. 
 
Future Work: We tried to find balancing point between privacy and utility using k-
anonymity, however there are some drawbacks of using k-anonymization for privacy 
preserving. Other privacy preserving algorithms can be used to find a balancing point 
between privacy and utility. 
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